By Dick Hoffmann
... As we continue to pour invaluable resources into our sixth year in Iraq, and the U.S. public and politicians wonder what we should do next, now may be a good time to revisit the overarching theory of our campaign plan in the Pacific: Colonel Cardinal's Iceberg Theory.
It's simple. It's clear. But it was difficult to win acceptance for this theory because it was a counterintuitive response to the horrific attacks on Sept. 11.
After 19 al-Qaeda operatives flew airplanes into buildings, our leaders saw those attacks as a global jihad. They extrapolated al-Qaeda's capabilities into an expansive network that threatened free-minded people throughout the world. Our leaders launched a “global war on terror” and gave al-Qaeda the epic jihad it wanted – elevating its marginal cause into a global military threat, characterizing its members as holy warriors rather than violent criminals.
Back at Pacific Command, our staff avoided this emotional vortex and professionally considered all facets of the attack and an appropriate response. We considered the desire to destroy al-Qaeda tactically, and the realistic capacity of our military to combat nonstate militias operationally. ...
The model also depicts overt U.S. military force as a cloud that darkens the sea of moderates while it strikes at the iceberg, chipping what little ice is exposed into the sea, chilling the environment and making terrorist networks actually grow larger.
The theory explains what we have done wrong, and it suggests what we should do to make things right. We need to shine light on the moderate Muslim majority. We need to warm their environment to Western cooperation and trade. We need to stir moderate actors in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iran, and support their efforts to help their neighborhoods subdue the extremists.
Colonel Cardinal's theory is a simple representation of a much more complex problem, but it is founded upon lessons from Northern Ireland, Malaysia and Vietnam. And mounting evidence supports it.
Look at the localized results in Iraq's Anbar province after U.S. forces shifted tactics from fighting the tribes to engaging them. When U.S. forces moved units off their sequestered citadels and into the neighborhoods, the moderates had enough support to begin melting al-Qaeda and shrinking their network.
Look at the Gallup study set forth in John Esposito's and Dalia Mogahed's new book “Who Speaks for Islam?” After 50,000 interviews of Muslims from over 35 countries, it found 93 percent declared themselves moderates.
Look at the list of moderate groups described in the recent RAND study “Building Moderate Muslim Networks.” Consider the moderate teachings and ascendance of Egypt's Grand Mufti, Sheik Ali Gomaa, described in U.S. News & World Report.
The sea of moderate Muslims exists. We need to stop chilling that sea with our conventional strategy of invading states and attacking extremists. We need to seek multilateral measures that promote moderate Muslims, their legitimacy and regional stability.
Acknowledging the limits of the military “surge” and implementing the diplomacy recommendations from the Baker-Hamilton Commission would be a start. Engaging and supporting Muslims so they can effectively resist the extremists in their midst is ultimately how we as a world community would melt these violent organizations.
Hoffmann was a Navy SEAL at the Pacific Command from 1998 to 2002. He recently finished 20 years of service and is currently a defense research analyst at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit research organization.
