Analyst's note: FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD AS SUBMITTED BY USREP ISSA. You may also want to read Bombshell now in Congressional Record .. bye bye Mr. Eric Holder
---
- Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I submit the following letters to Ranking Member ELIJAH CUMMINGS regarding H. Res. 711.
Congress of the United States, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC, May 30, 2012. Hon. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS,
Ranking Member, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,House of Representatives, Washington, DC. DEAR RANKING MEMBER CUMMINGS: This letter is a follow-up to my letter dated May 24, 2012 regarding the March 15, 2010 application for a wire intercept that the Justice Department authorized in support of Operation Fast and Furious.
ADDITIONAL WIRETAP APPLICATIONS OBTAINED BY THE COMMITTEE The Committee has obtained three additional wiretap applications from the Fast and Furious investigation, dated April 19, 2010, May 7, 2010, and May 18, 2010, respectively. These three applications pertain to four target telephone lines. Each application includes an accompanying memorandum, dated April 15, 2010, May 6, 2010, and May 14, 2010, respectively, from Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division Lanny A. Breuer to Paul M. O'Brien, Director, Office of Enforcement Operations, authorizing the interception application. The memoranda from Breuer were marked specifically for the attention of Emory Hurley, the lead federal prosecutor for Operation Fast and Furious.
In response to your personal request, I am enclosing copies of these three wiretap applications. Please take every precaution to treat them carefully and responsibly. I am hopeful that they will assist you in understanding the extent of information brought to the attention of senior officials in the Criminal Division who were responsible for reviewing the contents of the applications to determine if they were legally sufficient and conformed to Justice Department policy. The information is as vast as it is specific. These wiretap applications, signed by the late Deputy Assistant Attorney General John C. Keeney under the authority of his supervisor, Assistant Attorney General Breuer, provide additional insight into who knew--or should have known--what and when in Operation Fast and Furious.
To assist you in better understanding the facts, I appreciate the opportunity to provide relevant and necessary context for some of the information in these wiretap applications. Due to the sensitivity of the documents, individual targets and suspects will be referred to with anonymous designations. Nonetheless, you will see that the individuals referred to in the wiretap applications are well-known to our investigation.
FACTS LEARNED FROM THE FIRST WIRETAP APPLICATION As I understand it, the wiretap application authorized on March 15, 2010 was the first in this controversial case. Like many federal wiretap applications, the affidavit provided significant details about the controversial operational tactics used in the case, such as breaking off surveillance of a suspect who had illegally purchased firearms. As we now know, as early as December 2009 agents from ATF and DEA knew that the main target of the case, Target 1, planned to acquire firearms for the purpose of transporting them to Mexico. In fact, the affidavit in the first wiretap application provides entire conversations obtained through a separate DEA wire intercept detailing Target 1's efforts. The affidavit acknowledges that while monitoring the DEA target telephone numbers, law enforcement officers intercepted calls that demonstrated that Target 1 was conspiring to purchase and transport firearms for the purpose of trafficking the firearms from the United States to Mexico.
At the time it was preparing the first wiretap affidavit, ATF was aware that from September 2009 to March 15, 2010, Target 1 acquired at least 852 firearms valued at approximately $500,000 through straw purchasers. As of March 15, 2010, ATF had identified 21 of these straw purchasers. Between September 23, 2009 and January 27, 2010, 139 firearms purchased by these straw purchasers were recovered--81 of those in Mexico. These recoveries occurred one to 49 days after their purchase in Arizona. The document reflects that the Justice Department should have been fully aware that large sums of money were being used to purchase a large numbers of firearms, many of which were flowing across the border. In fact, ATF even knew the tactics the smugglers were using to bring the guns into Mexico. The straw purchasers would purchase the firearms in Arizona and then transport them either to Mexico or a location near the U.S.-Mexico border from which others would drive the guns into Mexico.
The first wiretap application in Fast and Furious contains rich detail about the transactions by many of the straw purchasers. Given this detail, it shocks the conscience that federal law enforcement officials intentionally abandoned surveillance. Even more shocking is that upon reviewing these facts, senior Justice Department officials authorized the wiretap applications instead of shutting down the investigation.
NEW INFORMATION CONTAINED IN ADDITIONAL WIRETAP APPLICATIONS These three additional wiretap applications further demonstrate that senior officials in the Justice Department's Criminal Division failed to sound the alarm, despite being presented with unmistakable evidence of the extent of the Fast and Furious gun trafficking ring. Given the danger involved, these officials should have intervened without hesitation. Throughout this investigation, one of my goals has been to hold these officials accountable for their management failures. In public statements, you have indicated you agree with this objective. Given this new evidence obtained by the Committee, I expect you to join me in seeking to hold these officials accountable.
SENIOR DOJ OFFICIALS KNEW BY MAY 2010 THAT AT LEAST 1,500 FIREARMS WERE INVOLVED, AND RECOVERIES IN MEXICO WERE ONGOING The affidavits for the additional wiretap applications demonstrate that senior officials at both ATF and Justice Department headquarters knew that Target 1 was continuing to acquire firearms illegally and traffic them to Mexico. By April 19, 2010, Target 1 had acquired at least 1,217 firearms through straw purchasers, costing approximately $800,000. By May 17, 2010, less than a month later, Target 1 had acquired nearly 300 additional firearms. Between September 23, 2009 and March 23, 2010, 302 of these firearms were recovered, including 182 in Mexico and 116 along the U.S.-Mexico border. These recoveries occurred between one and 105 days after the firearms were purchased in Arizona. The affidavits illustrate that ATF allowed Target 1 to continue to operate the firearms trafficking ring despite evidence indicating that they should have shut it down. Senior Department officials also failed to act on these facts. As a result, Target 1 was able to acquire even more firearms.
MONITORED PHONE CALLS DETAIL LARGE NUMBERS OF FIREARMS The affidavits include details of phone conversations showing that Target 1 and related straw purchasers were heavily involved in illegal firearms trafficking. For example, one affidavit details recorded conversations over the course of a 30-day period between Straw Purchaser Y and a cooperating FFL. In each of these recorded conversations, Straw Purchaser Y discussed future firearms purchases from the FFL. Following each of those conversations, Straw Purchaser Y later arrived at the FFL and purchased firearms.
In that month alone, Straw Purchaser Y bought a total of 120 AK-47 type rifles, 6 FN Herstal 5.7 caliber pistols, a Springfield Armory .40 caliber pistol, a Glock .45 caliber pistol, a Colt model ``El Jefe'' .38 super, and a Barrett .50 caliber rifle. One person's purchase of over 120 assault-type firearms in less than a month should have set off alarm bells for Criminal Division lawyers reading these affidavits. That fact alone should have been enough for a senior Department official to stop this program. Nobody did. This failure to raise an alarm represents a major breakdown in leadership.
SURVEILLANCE CONTINUES ON THE ILLEGAL PURCHASE AND TRANSFER OF FIREARMS In addition to recording conversations of straw purchasers, ATF surveillance units continued to observe them buy guns illegally. For example, on April 16, 2010 surveillance units witnessed Straw Purchaser Y buy three Barrett .50-caliber rifles at a cost of $9,000 each from an FFL. Surveillance followed Straw Purchaser Y and observed him transfer at least one of the rifles into a vehicle registered to Target 1. After the transfer, surveillance followed Target 1's vehicle to the residence of Straw Purchaser V, where the firearm was unloaded from the vehicle. Again, law enforcement did not interdict these guns or make an arrest.
On April 24, 2010, surveillance units observed Straw Purchaser Y purchase three FN Herstal 5.7 mm pistols from the same FFL. Later that day, surveillance units followed Straw Purchaser Y to his residence, where the same vehicle belonging to Target 1 was parked. After leaving Straw Purchaser Y's residence, the vehicle was later observed at the residence of Straw Purchaser V. At that point, surveillance was simply terminated.
A Barrett .50-caliber is a fearsome rifle that New York City Police Commissioner Ray Kelly has called a ``weapon of war.'' Senior Justice Department officials should have asked tough questions of ATF about the circumstances surrounding each of these purchases. Given the circumstances of these purchases and the subsequent transfer to Target 1's vehicle, senior Department officials had a duty to intervene in the operation to ensure that it was being conducted in accordance with the law and Department policy. Instead, they stood by as the straw purchasing ring continued unabated.
TRACKING BORDER CROSSINGS The affidavits also describe Target 1's border crossings, some of which occurred immediately following periods of buying from the straw purchasers. From December 17, 2009 to March 23, 2010, Target 1 made 13 documented crossings from Mexico into the United States. Eleven of these crossings occurred at Texas points of entry.
On December 31, 2009, Straw Purchaser Y purchased seven firearms. The following day, Target 1 crossed by vehicle from Mexico into the United States via a port of entry in Fabens, Texas. From December 30, 2009 to January 15, 2010, Straw Purchaser Y and Straw Purchaser Z purchased a combined total of 80 firearms. Then, on January 18, 2010, Target 1 again crossed from Mexico into the United States via the Faben, Texas point of entry. From January 26, 2010 to February 12, 2010, Straw Purchaser B, Straw Purchaser N, and Straw Purchaser Y purchased 62 firearms combined. On February 13, February 15, and February 16, 2010, Target 1 crossed by vehicle from Mexico into the United States via a port of entry in El Paso, Texas. From April 6, 2010 to April 24, 2010, Straw Purchaser Y purchased 24 firearms. On April 26, 2010, Target 1 crossed by vehicle from Mexico into the
[Page: E1189] GPO's PDF
Moreover, one of the affidavits states that ATF agents believed Straw Purchaser Y was also traveling to El Paso, Texas to receive U.S. currency to transport back to Mexico for future gun purchases in the Phoenix, Arizona area. For example, on March 23, 2010, the day after Straw Purchaser Y returned from El Paso, Texas, Straw Purchaser M, Straw Purchaser N, and Straw Purchaser Q purchased a total of 30 AK-47 type rifles and 7.62x39 caliber ammunition from Phoenix, Arizona FFLs. Straw Purchaser Y traveled to El Paso, Texas on two occasions after March 21, 2010. On both occasions, Straw Purchaser Y drove to El Paso, Texas, stayed at a hotel approximately one day, and then drove back to Phoenix, Arizona. On the second occasion, surveillance units observed Straw Purchaser Y meeting with an unknown individual before returning to Phoenix, Arizona a short time later.
CONCLUSION These wiretap affidavits show that straw purchasers were buying massive numbers of guns from Phoenix area FFLs, and that federal law enforcement officials were contemporaneously aware of many of these sales. By monitoring and recording phone calls and conducting extensive surveillance, ATF tracked the actions of the firearms trafficking ring. ATF knew, and shared with the Criminal Division, that Target 1 facilitated the illegal transfer of these firearms to Mexico for the drug cartels. The volume of firearms distributed by the gun trafficking ring was a major threat to public safety. Despite the volume of information gathered through this field work, no one in ATF or Justice Department headquarters took action. This is inexcusable.
The new facts these wiretap applications reveal are dismaying. More than we previously believed, senior officials at the Department of Justice were aware of specific information about ATF's efforts to monitor illegal transactions and subsequently abandon surveillance. Now, more than ever, it is imperative that you join me in demanding that these senior officials be held accountable.
Sincerely,
Darrell Issa, Chairman. -- Congress of the United States, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC, June 1, 2012. Hon. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS,
Ranking Member, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,House of Representatives, Washington, DC. DEAR RANKING MEMBER CUMMINGS: This letter is a follow-up to my letters dated May 24, 2012 and May 30, 2012 regarding the applications for wire intercepts the Justice Department authorized on March 15, 2010, April 19, 2010, May 7, 2010, and May 18, 2010 in support of Operation Fast and Furious.
ADDITIONAL WIRETAP APPLICATIONS OBTAINED BY THE COMMITTEE The Committee has obtained two additional wiretap applications from the Fast and Furious investigation, dated June 2, 2010 and July 2, 2010. These two applications pertain to two target telephone lines. Each application includes an accompanying memorandum, dated June 1, 2010 and July 1, 2010, respectively, from Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer to Paul M. O'Brien, Director of the Office of Enforcement Operations, authorizing the interception application. The memoranda from Breuer were marked specifically for the attention of Emory Hurley, the lead federal prosecutor for Operation Fast and Furious.
These documents further highlight the scope and volume of information known by the Department of Justice, including senior officials in the Criminal Division, about Fast and Furious. Between March and July 2010, these officials had access to rapidly mounting evidence of firearms trafficking and gunwalking, and had multiple opportunities to halt Operation Fast and Furious. They did not. Instead, these officials authorized the wiretap applications, and Fast and Furious continued unabated.
In response to your personal request, I am enclosing copies of these two wiretap applications. Please take every precaution to treat them carefully and responsibly. I am hopeful that they will assist you in understanding the extent of information brought to the attention of senior officials in the Criminal Division who were responsible for reviewing the contents of the applications to determine if they were legally sufficient and conformed to Justice Department policy. The information they contain is as vast as it is specific. These wiretap applications were signed by Jason M. Weinstein and Kenneth A. Blanco, respectively, under the authority of their supervisor, Assistant Attorney General Breuer.
To assist you in better understanding the facts, I appreciate the opportunity to provide relevant and necessary context for some of the information in these wiretap applications. Due to the sensitivity of the documents, individual targets and suspects will be referred to with anonymous designations. Nonetheless, you will see that the individuals referred to in the wiretap applications are well-known to our investigation.
FACTS LEARNED FROM THE PRIOR WIRETAP APPLICATIONS The prior four wiretap applications provided a breathtaking amount of facts and details about the operational tactics used in Fast and Furious. The applications demonstrate that ATF knew as early as December 2009 that the main target of the case, Target 1, planned to acquire firearms for the purpose of transporting them to Mexico. In fact, the applications include entire conversations obtained through a DEA wire intercept demonstrating Target l's specific plans. The applications acknowledge that while monitoring the DEA target telephone numbers, law enforcement officers intercepted calls that demonstrated that Target 1 was conspiring to purchase and transport firearms for the purpose of trafficking the firearms from the United States to Mexico.
The applications include transcripts of phone conversations showing that Target 1 and related straw purchasers were heavily involved in illegal firearms trafficking. The applications describe ATF surveillance units observing straw purchasers buying guns illegally. The applications also describe Target l's border crossings, which often coincided with firearms purchases by the straw buyers. The affidavits even show that firearms were recovered in Mexico soon after straw purchasers bought them in Arizona, sometimes the next day. Though aware of all of these facts, ATF did not arrest anyone in the gun trafficking ring until many months later.
NEW INFORMATION CONTAINED IN ADDITIONAL WIRETAP APPLICATIONS These two additional wiretap applications further demonstrate that senior officials in the Justice Department's Criminal Division failed to sound the alarm, despite being presented with unmistakable evidence of the extent of the gun trafficking ring and the controversial tactics used in Fast and Furious. Given the danger involved, these officials should have intervened without hesitation. Throughout this investigation, one of my goals has been to hold these officials accountable for their management failures. In public statements, you have indicated you agree with this objective.
$1 MILLION WORTH OF FIREARMS From September 2009 to July 2010, Target 1 acquired over 1,500 firearms through his straw purchasers at a cost of approximately $1,000,000. In other words, Target l's firearms trafficking ring acquired at least an additional 700 guns at a cost of $500,000 in approximately four months after the Justice Department authorized the first wiretap application.
From December 17, 2009 to July 2, 2010, Target 1 crossed from Mexico into the United States a total of 15 times. Thirteen of these 15 crossings occurred at Texas port of entries. According to the applications, Target 1 orchestrated both narcotics and firearms transactions with the intent to sell narcotics, purchase firearms, and then transport the firearms into Mexico from the United States. Although ATF and the Justice Department were aware of this information for many months, they took no steps to interrupt Target l's criminal activities.
STRAW PURCHASERS BY THE NUMBERS These additional wiretap applications again provide startling numbers regarding Target l's straw purchasers. For example, by July 2, 2010, Straw Purchaser Y had purchased at least 616 firearms from the Arizona Federal Firearms Licensees (FFLs). Y purchased 125 of these guns between March 26, 2010 and June 5, 2010. By March 26, 2010, ATF had only recovered 81 firearms purchased by Straw Purchaser Y, including 28 in Mexico, within eight to 120 days after the firearms were purchased in Arizona.
Straw Purchaser Z had bought 281 firearms from Arizona FFLs by June 8, 2010. By July 2, 2010, at least 57 of these guns had been recovered in the possession of others or at crime scenes, either in the United States or Mexico. Surveillance units also observed a vehicle registered to Straw Purchaser Z parked in front of Target l's residence from June 4, 2010 until June 7, 2010. On June 7, 2010, Customs and Border Protection officers observed Straw Purchaser Z and Target 1 crossing into the United States from Mexico in a vehicle registered to Straw Purchaser B.
Between January 26, 2010 and June 5, 2010, Straw Purchaser N purchased 96 firearms from Arizona FFLs. From October 5, 2009 through June 8, 2010, Straw Purchaser B bought 83 firearms from Arizona FFLs. In that same period, Straw Purchaser Q purchased 141 firearms.
The applications painstakingly document several of the straw purchasers' firearms acquisitions, including specific quantities, dates, and locations. The applications also specify to whom the firearms were transferred, and even at what specific crime scenes the guns were later recovered. Though fully aware that these firearms were being smuggled into the hands of the Mexican drug cartels, senior Department officials allowed the illegal purchases and transfers to continue. The continued acquisition of firearms by the gun trafficking network exacerbated the threat to public safety. Even when faced with these stark facts, senior Department officials failed to put an end to this operation.
ADDITIONAL WIRETAP APPLICATIONS You now have a total of six applications for Fast and Furious. Officials in the Justice Department's Criminal Division authorized these applications on the following dates:
[Page: E1190] GPO's PDF
There may be additional wiretaps from Fast and Furious that are not currently in the Committee's possession. During his transcribed interview, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Jason Weinstein said:
Q. And did you review wiretap applications in Operation Fast and Furious?
A. I reviewed what I believe to be three of the wiretaps in Fast and Furious, in what I now know to be Fast and Furious.
Weinstein later clarified:
Q. How many did you authorize?
A. I authorized three to the best of my recollection.
Q. You were the signing official authorizing three?
A. On three of them, yes.
As the chart above reflects, however, Weinstein only signed one of the wiretaps currently in possession of the Committee. This leaves the likely possibility that at least two more wiretaps from Fast and Furious exist. To fully understand the scope of what the Criminal Division knew about Fast and Furious and when they knew it, it is essential that the Committee have access to these other two wiretap applications, if they exist.
CONCLUSION The volume of information known to senior Justice Department officials regarding Fast and Furious by July 2, 2010 is overwhelming. Despite this, Fast and Furious continued for nearly seven more months. Notably, only after U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry's murder were arrests made and indictments issued. In light of the information contained in these wiretap affidavits, approved under Assistant Attorney General Breuer's authority, Washington, D.C.-based Justice Department officials can no longer disclaim responsibility in failing to shut down Fast and Furious. We now know numerous senior officials had access to information about the controversial and dangerous operational tactics used in Fast and Furious.
At the Committee's February 2, 2012 hearing with the Attorney General, you stated that we ``now have all the facts.'' These wiretap applications prove that your comment was premature. The information contained in these wiretaps underscores the reality that we do not have all the facts. I hope you will join me in strongly urging the Department of Justice to cooperate with our investigation fully until we obtain all the facts and it holds those responsible for authorizing the continuance of this operation accountable.
Sincerely,
Darrell Issa, Chairman.
