(Analyst's note: Absolutely a must read article written by three heavy thinkers in the field of national security. The ability to "speak softly and carry a big stick" is still a valid principle. To do otherwise, we must always be mindful of what neighborhoods we drive through. There really are situations and people in this world where a soft word will not turn away unwarranted wrath. Evil really does exist. National security is obviously not one of the strong points of this Obama administration. As a boy, I never did like to fight, but I soon learned that if I were going to survive, that it was important to be honestly prepared to do so. Better yet, it was necessary for the bullies to know that I was not a good target - unpredictable and willing respond with significant fierceness if cornered. Nothing much changes in the world, except for those who have never developed "street smarts" or developed an understanding of the world as it really is. And for them, the results is seldom good. Semper Fidelis.)
What sort of national security policy can we expect from an administration that seeks a “world free of nuclear weapons?” In principle, this is a reasonable objective. In reality, especially considering actual and probable nuclear proliferation by North Korea, Iran and possibly their proxies, it is preposterous. For the United States, any policy based on such an unrealizable objective is very dangerous.
In matters of national security policy, every intellectual failure may be dense with implication. The administration, by failing to identify serious strategic threats and objectives, has ignored the core expectations of national survival logic in an anarchic world. Before a safer America could ever be born from any policy of worldwide nuclear disarmament, a gravedigger would have to wield the forceps.
Any further nuclear proliferation should be curtailed, but, ironically, this commendable goal would be degraded by the administration’s proposals. By themselves, nuclear weapons are neither good nor evil. In certain circumstances, these weapons may even be indispensable to national security and deterrence. The nuclear stalemate between this country and the former Soviet Union played a critical role in preventing World War III. And however “ambiguous,” Israel’s implicit nuclear deterrent is required for that tiny country’s capacity to simply endure.
The naïve nuclear hopes of the administration and its advisors represent an elaborate fiction. What we require, instead, is a model of international relations that reflects, realistically, the prevailing passions and principles of all our potential enemies in world politics. Such a model, wherein strategic threats and opportunities would be called by their correct names, would be drawn not from these idealized visions, but from the informed and indisputable awareness that America’s multiple enemies, still crouched in the bruising darkness, often remain stubbornly face down to peace with the United States.
When Pericles delivered his Funeral Oration, with its praise of Athenian civilization, his perspective was inner-directed. As recorded by Thucydides, Pericles remarked: “What I fear more than the strategies of our enemies is our own mistakes.” Later, in Rome, the philosopher/statesman Cicero inquired: “What can be done against force without force?” Today, the White House must still understand that in a world of international anarchy, foreign policy must aim above all at maintaining and improving the country’s relative power position.
America needs nuclear weapons for deterrence. More precisely, we need to continually upgrade and refine these weapons, as well as their associated strategic doctrine. We need to recapitalize our national nuclear deterrent, and ensure that we can maintain all essential global power projection capabilities. This means, at a minimum, a re-examination of nuclear targeting doctrine, this time with regard to current threats from other countries and their proxies. It also means preparing for a world in which both our national and sub-national enemies may sometimes be irrational. In all of these matters, the president’s current glide path to a nuclear-free world is counterproductive.
The Obama administration
may wish to distance itself from the prior Bush administration’s defense policies, but a key concern of U.S. strategic doctrine must still be preemption. Like it or not, there are major threats on the horizon that may still call for anticipatory self-defense. In our uncertain strategic future, where enemy rationality cannot always be assumed, and where the essential effectiveness of national ballistic missile defense would be too low, the only reasonable alternative to an American preemption could be surrender or defeat.
Sea power still has its proper place. Observing actions of Iran, Russia, China and North Korea, future enemy missile launches could come from container ships off our shores. Launches against Israel could likely also come directly from Iran, so a modernized U.S. anti-missile fleet capability should be positioned in the Mediterranean, Red and Arabian seas. For Israel, its current Dolphin class submarines may have to be upgraded, and so may its ever-improving system of ballistic missile defense.
A nuclear threat to American cities need not come from enemy missiles. It could also come from cars and trucks, and from ships used only for “dirty-bomb” dispersals. Ballistic missile defense would be of no use against any such attacks.
Could we make enemy states and their surrogates believe that proxy acts of nuclear terrorism would elicit an unacceptable retaliation against them directly? Perhaps we could, but functional answers can never emerge from a futile plan for global nuclear disarmament.
America’s strategic doctrine must rest on the idea that significant threats of war and terrorism may now derive from a “clash of civilizations,” and not merely from narrow political or ideological differences. This does not mean that the administration is wrong in expanding emphasis on negotiation and diplomacy, but only that it should also acknowledge that some of our principal enemies will be unresponsive to traditional deterrent policies. These enemies, sworn to otherworldly ideals of Jihad, will be animated not by the ordinary secular promises of hegemony, wealth and privilege, but rather by power over death.
Some of these enemies could come to resemble the suicide bomber writ large. Such enemies, the administration should understand, may not concede even an inch to such conventionally accepted international norms as compromise, coexistence and peaceful settlement.
If launched at any time of grave national instability, an act of nuclear terrorism against the United States could have existential consequences. To prevent the “Ryder truck scenario,” which could involve either a radiological or “real” (authentic chain reaction) nuclear weapon, the administration’s strategic policy would have to hold the state sponsors accountable. This policy, of course, should initially offer these states a suitable diplomatic option.
If, however, such an outreach should fail, the administration must then make clear that any terrorist proxy nuclear explosion in this country would certainly elicit an unacceptably damaging retaliation. This means, among other steps, that we (1) unambiguously target these sponsor states; and (2) plainly and regularly war-game retaliatory options with our National Command Authorities. Although the circumstances are different in several key respects, this “exercising” was done with evident success during the Cold War.
Nuclear weapons are not going to go away. Despite his personal wishes and visions, the president must now learn to base our national strategic policy on precisely this sober understanding. Soon, therefore, this administration must begin to construct a broad, coherent and compelling strategic plan from which specific policy options can be extrapolated. This plan should prepare to deal effectively with both our national and sub-national adversaries, some of whom might sometimes even be willing to act irrationally.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Paul E. Vallely, Major General (USA/Ret.) is an author, military strategist and Chairman of Stand Up America and Save Our Democracy Projects. Louis René Beres (Ph.D., Princeton, 1971) is Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University. Thomas McInerney, Lt. General (USAF/Ret) is co-author (with MG Paul E. Vallely) of The Endgame: Winning the War on Terror. General McInerney is retired Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force
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